The Perils of Playing for Time
James Cullen
One phrase I keep coming back to is “playing for time” – I see it as a good description of the strategy (or lackthereof) underlying most of the economic policy decisions that emanate from Washington.
What areas are being targeted, and how is it being accomplished?
Banks and Other “Financials”
The entire point of playing for time is to increase optionality. More information becomes available, and perhaps the economic situation will change for the better. But keeping businesses alive comes with indirect costs – more competition reduces the ability of healthier firms to pick up profitable customers – and with an implicit backstop from the government, borderline financial companies are incentivized to take more risks than usual.
The immediate result of those actions is to accelerate consumption, defer pain (losses), or interfere in allowing the market to set the prices it would otherwise set. To loosely quote a recent note from David Rosenberg, only in America are policies that encourage excessive consumption celebrated as a success. Yet that’s exactly what’s being done through a program like Cash for Clunkers, and the public reception has been very enthusiastic – a dangerous turning point in the series of bailouts.
I’m wary of data (and interpretations) suggesting that recovery is at hand, because uneconomic activity can only be encouraged for so long. That’s a lesson the Fed should have learned from previous heroic rescues during downturns, but chooses not to, because the expedient solution is to shovel money into any area of the economy that will take it.
Home prices, which undoubtedly went through an enormous bubble, are now the subject of a great experiment in controlled deflation. “Affordability” products sprung up earlier in the decade, when buyers had no savings for a down payment. Those turned out to have disastrous consequences, and yet policy now is directed toward offering what amounts to down payment assistance via a tax credit, and artificially low mortgage rates through the Fed’s market operations. We’ve been down this road before…
Boosting GDP for one or two quarters with the $3 billion (at present) Cash for Clunkers will quickly be revealed as wasted money; there are only so many new cars that people need. Most shrewd observers have realized by now that the program will skew statistics favorably for a time, without doing any real good. Of course, if the point is to save the “American” automakers, the program has been a failure on that front too.
The silent bailout of the financial system through zero interest rates and guaranteed debt is more pernicious – the TLGP, for instance, is estimated to be a $24 billion gift to those using it. And yet, little will be said about that as long as the impact on the Treasury’s borrowing costs remain marginal. Can we carry-trade weak financial institutions to profitability by leveraging the U.S. government’s borrowing ability? Likewise, can we store the health of balance sheets by stealing from savers through interest rates effectively at zero? We’re certainly trying.
Across sectors, there are many companies awaiting a turn in the cycle – and the only reason they’re still around is due to the good graces of the government. But cycles don’t truly turn until fewer people are around to looking at them, and it’s doubtful policymakers are willing to adopt this position and let liquidations occur. Playing for time comes at a cost – on a personal level, it means delaying decisive action that stands a chance of accomplishing something. I can only imagine what it will mean for the country as a whole.
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September 18th, 2009 at 1:13 am
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